Abstract: In this study, the author has designed new verifiable ( t, n ) threshold untraceable signature. schemes. The proposed schemes have the following properties: ( 1 ) Verification: The shadows of the secret distributed by the trusted center can be verified by all of the participants;(2) Security: Even if the number of the dishonest member is over the value of the threshold, they cannot get the system secret parameters , such as the group secret key, and forge other member's individual signature; (3) Efficient verification: The verifier can verify the group signature easily and the verification time of the group signature is equivalent to that of an individual signature; (4) Untraceability: The signers of the group signature, cannot he traced.
INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures play an important role in our modem electronic society due to their properties of integrity and authentication. The integrity property ensures that the received message is not modified, and the authentication property ensures that the sender is not impersonated. In well-known that in conventional digital signatures, such as RSA and DSA, a single signer is sufficient to produce a valid signature; and that anyone can verify the validity of any given signature. However, on many occasions, we need to share the responsibility of signing the message with a set of signers. Issuing checks for a company is an example of this. For the sake of security, it may be a policy of a company that checks must be signed by a group of individuals rather than by one person. Threshold signature schemes and multi-signature schemes are designed to solve such problems. There are two major differences between multi-signature and threshold signature schemes. Firstly, it is not necessary to restrict the number of signers to generate a valid signature in a multi-signature scheme. In contrast to a multi-signature scheme, a threshold value t must be predetermined to guarantee the security of the system in a threshold signature scheme. Secondly, a threshold signature represents the signature signed by the group, while a multi-signature is a signature which represents a set of individuals who sign the message. Consequently, a threshold signature is suitable for the case where the members of a group are allowed to sign on behalf of the group. Desmedt and Frankel (1992) proposed the concept of a ( t, n ) threshold signature scheme based on RSA system. In this scheme, they applied a trusted key authentication center to determine the group's secret key and the secret keys of all group members. Ham (1994) used the cryptographic technique of Shamir's perfect secret sharing which is based on the Lagrange interpolating polynomial and digital signature algorithm to construct a (t, n) threshold signature scheme designed to partition the group secret key K into n different shadows. By collecting any of the t shadows, the group signature can be easily generated. However, Li et al. (1995) pointed rout that Desmedt and Frankel' s scheme and Ham's scheme may suffer from conspiracy attacks and the secret keys can be revealed if t or more participants act in collusion. To avoid conspiracy attacks, the proposed schemes (Li et al., 1995) attach a random number to the secret key held by each member, so that the security of their schemes is guaranteed. But, the additional random number makes the ( t, n ) threshold sign-atures schemes have the property of traceability . However, Michels and Horster(1997) , Wang et al. (2000; 2001) pointed out that threshold signature schemes ( Li et al. , 1995) Wang et al. (1998) proposed two new ( t, n) threshold signature schemes with traceable signers that can withstand conspiracy attacks without attaching a secret number. However, Tseng and Jan(1999) and Li et al. (2001) showed that the proposed schemes are insecure by presenting a forgery attack on them. Lee et al. (2000) proposed a ( t, n ) threshold signature with untraceability. In their scheme, the group signature can be verified by any outsider without the need to identify the identities of the signers. However, t or more shareholders can reveal the group secret key if they conspire attack.
To prevent cheating by the dealer, Verifiable Secret Sharing(VSS) was first proposed by Chor et al. (1985) .
VSS schemes allow each participant to verify that his share is consistent with the other shares, and hence allow the honest participants to ensure that the secret to be reconstruct is unique.
In this study, the author has designed new verifiable ( t, n ) threshold untraceable signature schemes by employing both the idea of a ( t, n ) threshold untraceable signature ( Lee et al. , 2000) and the idea of VSS ( Chor et al. , 1985) .
PROPOSED SCHEME
The verifiable (t, n ) threshold untraceable signature scheme uses a mutually trusted center. The word "trusted" implies that the trusted center must ensure that the secret information is not disclosed or revealed to unauthorized people and prevent unauthorized alteration or destruction of data.
The scheme consists of four phases: the system initiation phase, the distribution of secret shadows and verification phase, the partial signature generation phase, and the group signature generation and verification phase. The four phases detailed below. Phase 1 System Initialization Phase
The system contains a mutually trusted center responsible for selecting all parameters. Assume that there are n members in a group, and the set of group members is denoted as A. Here I A I = n. Any t legitimate members of A can represent the group to sign a message m . The set of any t legitimate members of A is denoted as B. Note that IBI = t. The mutually trusted center selects the following parameters: A number, N= p'q = (2p' + 1)-(2q' + 1), where p, q, p' and q' are distinct large safe primes.
A generator g with order v = p' 9 q' in ZN 9
A system public value e such that gcd( e, v) = 1, where e" d = 1 mod v and d is a system secret value. 
The mutually trusted center sends xi to each 
